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Abstract 
In mid-September 2008, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs) began to experience run-like redemption requests after a large fund 
“broke the buck,” owing to a large position in Lehman commercial paper (CP). Funds, which 
as a group were the largest investors in CP, retreated from CP, including asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP). Funds also sought to raise cash to meet redemptions by selling 
assets but were reluctant to sell ABCP into a depressed market. As the CP and ABCP markets 
seized up, it became difficult for issuers to place new paper, and concern grew about possible 
contagion of the broader financial markets and economy. As a result, on September 19, 2008, 
the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), pursuant to which the Fed made discount 
window loans to depository institutions and broker dealers to purchase high-quality ABCP 
from eligible MMMFs, providing cash for redemptions. Utilization of the AMLF peaked in 
October 2008, when outstanding loans totaled $152 billion, or the equivalent of 21% of all 
outstanding ABCP. As markets improved, utilization of the AMLF waned, and the program 
expired on February 1, 2010, without the government experiencing any losses. The AMLF is 
credited with having helped to stabilize MMMF redemptions, to restore liquidity to the ABCP 
market, and to have fostered liquidity in the money markets in general, but its impact must 
be considered in light of other coexistent programs.  
Keywords: money market mutual funds, asset-backed commercial paper, wholesale 
funding, money markets, AMLF, Lehman Brothers, the Reserve Primary Fund, runs, break 
the buck, discount window
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At a Glance   
During the fall of 2008, money market mutual 
funds (MMMFs) experienced run-like 
redemption requests after the Reserve 
Primary Fund “broke the buck,” owing to a 
large position in Lehman Brothers commercial 
paper (CP). As a result, many MMMFs reacted 
by shortening the maturity of their portfolio 
holdings, leading to a contraction in the CP and 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
markets, of which MMMFs were significant 
investors. Additionally, MMMFs needing cash 
found it difficult to sell their investments into 
an illiquid market.  
On September 19, the Federal Reserve 
announced the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF). Under the AMLF, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston (FRBB) loaned funding 
to depository institutions, bank holding 
companies, and US branches of foreign banks 
to purchased eligible high-quality USD-
denominated ABCP from MMMFs experiencing 
distress. The term of the loan was coexistent 
with the maturity of the ABCP, which secured 
the loan, and the borrower paid interest at the prime credit rate (FR OIG 2010). 
Summary Evaluation 
The AMLF reached its peak utilization soon after initiation—in October 2008, outstanding 
AMLF loans totaled $152 billion, or the equivalent of 21% of all outstanding ABCP. As 
redemption pressures on funds subsided and markets improved, utilization of the AMLF 
waned, except for an increase prior to the release of the stress test results in May 2009. The 
program expired on February 1, 2010, without the government experiencing any losses. The 
AMLF is credited with having helped to stabilize MMMF redemptions, to restore liquidity to 
the ABCP market, and to have fostered liquidity in the money markets in general. However, 
any evaluation must consider the several other programs in effect that also targeted the same 
problem.  
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To help restore liquidity to the ABCP markets 
and thereby to help money funds meet demands for 
redemption 
Legal Authority Sections FRA  13(3) and FRA 
10 
Announcement Date  September 19, 2008 
Operational Date September 22, 2008 
Expiration Date February 1, 2010 
Peak Utilization  $152.1 billion (October 1, 
2008) 
Participants Depository institutions and 
broker-dealers that purchased 
highly rated ABCP from 
eligible US MMMFs 
Rate Primary credit rate 
Collateral High-quality ABCP meeting 
certain criteria 
Haircut/Recourse No/No 
Term  Up to 120 days for depository 
institutions; up to 270 days for 
other Borrowers 
Managed by Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money  
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
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(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 














Size of banking 
system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
 




of banking system 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 
for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 
for 2008 
 








On September 16, 2008, a day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, the 
$62 billion Reserve Primary Fund money market mutual fund (MMMF) “broke the buck,” 
announcing a net asset value (NAV) of less than $1 per share because of a large exposure to 
Lehman Brothers commercial paper (CP). This unexpected action prompted run-like 
redemption requests by many MMMF investors. In the week following Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
investors withdrew $230 billion from MMMFs, $117 billion of this from prime MMMFs, as 
they sought out funds investing only in government securities (Adrian, Kimbrough, and 
Marchioni 2011).  
MMMFs scrambled to raise cash to pay redemptions while maintaining their $1 per share 
NAV, and many funds refused to roll over maturing CP or to purchase new CP, including 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Because MMMFs are the largest investor group in 
CP, their actions had great impact on the CP market. Within a month of Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
outstanding CP had declined by $300 billion (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). 
Coupled with the retraction in outstanding amounts, CP maturities became severely 
restricted, and rates soon elevated sharply, all but freezing the market for term CP and ABCP 
(Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).  
Although needing funds, many funds resisted selling assets at depressed prices. Notably, CP 
and ABCP combined represented approximately 45% of fund assets, but the secondary 
market was limited (Duygan-Bump et al. 2012). The secondary market for ABCP began to 
seize up, making it difficult for issuers to place new paper, and there was concern about 
possible contagion of the broader financial markets and economy.  
To address the redemption stresses on MMMFs, on September 19, 2008, the US Treasury 
Department announced the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds 
(Temporary Guarantee), which guaranteed MMMF accounts of funds choosing to participate 
against losses resulting from a fund breaking the buck.4 On that same day, the Federal 
Reserve also announced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) to provide additional liquidity to borrowers that purchased paper 
from the MMMFs.  
Program Description 
The AMLF provided nonrecourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding 
companies (Borrowers),5 which in turn used the funds to purchase high-quality ABCP from 
MMMFs that were experiencing redemption pressures. As shown in Figure 1 and further 
described below, potential Borrowers applied for loans from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston (FRBB). These loans were secured by specifically identified ABCP to be purchased 
from an eligible MMMF. The term of the FRBB loan was coexistent with the term of the ABCP, 
and its principal was equal to the amortized value of the ABCP, which was the prescribed 
 
4 See U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Programs for Money Market Funds. https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx and McNamara 2016 for a discussion of the program.  
5 Eligible AMLF borrowers included US depository institutions, US bank holding companies, US broker-dealer 
subsidiaries of such holding companies, and US branches and agencies of foreign banks. When used in this 
discussion, depository institution or bank refers to all eligible institutions, unless the context requires 
otherwise.  
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purchase price. The Borrower was required to hold the ABCP until maturity, at which time it 
repaid the loan and applicable interest at the prime credit rate. Only US-denominated ABCP 
meeting certain ratings and other criteria was eligible for purchase.   
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
 
Note: This figure represents the operation of the AMLF using a stylized transaction, in which 
an MMMF obtains $1,000 in funds. An eligible Borrower purchases ABCP from an eligible 
MMMF at its amortized cost of $1,000. The eligible Borrower obtains a nonrecourse loan for 
$1,000 from the FRBB with the same maturity as the remaining maturity of the ABCP at the 
primary credit rate and pledges the $1,000 ABCP as collateral. The FRBB does not impose a 
haircut on the collateral backing the $1,000 loan to the eligible borrower. 
Source: Duygan-Bump et al. 2012.  
The FRBB administered the AMLF across all 12 Federal Reserve districts, utilizing existing 
discount window infrastructure (documentation and processes) and customary transaction 
parties such as Depository Trust Company (DTC).  
Authority for the AMLF 
The Fed could not purchase the ABCP outright because of statutory limitations, and so the 
AMLF was structured to lend the funds to purchase ABCP (Duygan-Bump et al. 2012). Banks, 
bank holding companies, broker-dealers, and foreign branches were enlisted as potential 
AMLF intermediaries and borrowers. The Fed relied on Section 10B of the Federal Reserve 
Act (FRA),6 which authorized Reserve banks to make usual lending to depository institutions 
(FOMC Minutes September 19, 2008). Additionally, the Fed then relied on its emergency 
authority under Section 13(3) of the FRA—which permitted it to make loans to any 
individual, partnership, or corporation in “unusual and exigent circumstances” if the Fed 
determined that the entity was “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from 
 
6 12 USC 347b(a), as amended: FRA §10B. Advances to Individual Member Banks. 
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other banking institutions.” Pursuant to Section 13(3), the Fed could authorize the Federal 
Reserve banks to make loans directly to broker-dealers and bank holding companies.7       
Eligible Borrowers 
To be considered eligible to borrow under the AMLF, a potential Borrower had to have in 
place with any Federal Reserve bank a master agreement that permitted borrowing from the 
discount window and (after June 26, 2009) enter into the AMLF Form of Letter Agreement 
(AMLF Agreement), agreeing to the terms of the program. If it did not, then it needed to 
complete the Operating Circular No. 10 documents for establishing discount window 
eligibility, submitting the documents to its local Federal Reserve bank. There were differing 
registration documents for US entities and for branches of non-US entities. An unregistered 
entity could also utilize a registered entity as a correspondent through which it arranged the 
borrowing by completing a Form of Correspondent Credit and Payment Agreement. (See 
Appendix A.) 
Additionally, a potential Borrower that was a broker-dealer participating in the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)8 could rely on its authorizing documentation under the PDCF 
to satisfy the AMLF resolution requirements (AMLF FAQs). 
A commentator emphasizes that main Borrowers under AMLF were bank holding 
companies, and this was crucial in the operations of this program, as the Fed was their sole 
regulator. This meant that the Fed did not have to coordinate with other bank regulators in 
allowing regulatory forbearance. 
Requesting an Advance under the AMLF 
A Borrower requested an advance under the AMLF by completing the ABCP MMMF Liquidity 
Facility Request Form,9 which required specific details regarding (i) the collateral to be 
purchased, (ii) the MMMFs that it was being purchased from and (iii) after June 26, 2009, 
 
7 The Fed did authorize direct lending to MMMFs under 13(3). On October 3, 2008, the Fed approved the Direct 
Money Market Mutual Fund Lending Facility (DMLF), which provided for direct lending to MMMFs. After 
approval, consultation with market participants indicated that they would not use the facility, most likely 
because of “statutory and fund-specific limitations,” and the DMLF was rescinded by notation vote, dated 
October 10, 2008, without implementation (Fed. Res. Mins Oct. 3, 2008). The DMLF may be indicative of the 
Fed’s limited knowledge of MMMFs, a type of entity that it did not regularly deal with, or of the extreme 
pressure and urgency in the face of which it was compelled to make decisions and design billion-dollar rescue 
facilities.  
“As staff discussed potential options with money fund managers, however, a seemingly insurmountable 
problem became apparent: Even if the Fed were willing to lend to MMFs, some funds lacked the authority to 
borrow money, and even those that had the authority generally were extremely reluctant to use it because they 
feared that disclosure of their borrowing would spook investors.” 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/02-Novel-LOLR-Prelim-Disc-Draft-
2018.09.11.pdf.  
8 The PDCF was a Fed lending program established under FRA Section 13(3) for primary dealers that operated 
similar to discount window lending as it functioned as a lender-of-last-resort facility. See Wiggins and Metrick 
2015 for a discussion of the program. 
9 Document is referred to in the research but has not yet been located. 
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share confirmation information from the MMMF’s transfer agent to satisfy the redemption 
threshold (discussed below). (AMLF FAQs).    
After June 26, 2009, any Borrower that had filed the Circular No. 10 documents prior to that 
date had to also submit, prior to any new extension of credit, the FRBB’s certification 
governing ABCP eligibility10 (AMLF FAQs).  
The AMLF required that the ABCP that would be purchased and that would secure the loan 
had to be transferred to the FRBB’s restricted account at the DTC before an advance/loan 
was approved. Once the ABCP was recorded, determined to be eligible, and valued, the loan 
funds would be transferred to the Borrower, which would then pay the MMMF.  
Summary of Loan Terms 
The Borrower was required to purchase the eligible ABCP collateral at the “amortized cost,” 
which was defined for purposes of the AMLF as “the Fund’s acquisition cost of the ABCP as 
adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount on the ABCP through the date 
of its purchase by the Borrower.” (AMLF T&Cs). In all cases, the amount of the loan equaled 
the purchase price of the ABCP collateral. 
The term of an AMLF loan matched the maturity of the ABCP collateral that was purchased 
with, and secured, the loan. Allowable terms varied from overnight to 270 days. For 
Borrowers that were banks and bank holding companies, no advance under the AMLF could 
extend beyond 120 days. For Borrowers that were not banks, terms could extend up to 270 
days. Prepayment of the AMLF loans was not permitted, in whole or in part, except in the 
event of bankruptcy or receivership of the Borrower.   
Loans under the AMLF were extended at the discount window’s primary credit rate in force 
on the date of the loan, and no other fees applied. During AMLF’s tenure, the primary credit 
rate ranged from 2.25%, at its inception, to 0.50% at its expiration. Rates were fixed for the 
term of the loan. 
Loans Were Secured and Nonrecourse 
Unlike under many Fed liquidity programs implemented to fight the crisis, no haircut was 
applied to the ABCP purchased. Also, unlike some programs, AMLF loans were nonrecourse 
to the Borrower if said Borrower complied with the AMLF requirements. If the Borrower 
failed to repay the Federal Reserve’s loan, the Borrower could surrender the ABCP. 
Additionally, the risk that the value of the ABCP would decrease was borne by the Fed, not 
the Borrower. This risk was transferred to the Fed once the ABCP had been approved as 
AMLF-eligible and the Borrower had successfully transferred the securities to the FRBB’s 
account at the DTC.  
Eligible ABCP Collateral 
The ABCP securing an AMLF loan had to be of high quality and meet certain specific criteria. 
Originally, AMLF-eligible collateral was limited to ABCP that: 
● was US-dollar-denominated; 
 
10 Document is referred to in the research but not yet located. 
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● was purchased by the Borrower on or after September 19, 2008, from a registered 
investment company that held itself out as an MMMF; 
● was purchased by the Borrower at the MMMF’s “amortized cost”—acquisition 
cost as adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount on the ABCP 
through the date of its purchase by the Borrower; 
● was rated A-1/P-1/F1 by at least two Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs). If rated by only one NRSRO, the ABCP must have been 
rated within that NRSRO’s top rating category; 
● was issued by an entity organized under the laws of the United States or a political 
subdivision thereof under a program that was in existence on September 18, 
2008, and actively issuing eligible ABCP directly to market investors; and 
● had a stated maturity that did not exceed 120 days if the borrower was a 
depository institution, or 270 days if the borrower was not a depository. (ABCP 
that had an extendable maturity could not be eligible collateral.) (AMLF T&Cs). 
Amortized Cost 
To prevent sales at depressed values that might incite another MMMF to “break the buck,” 
the Fed required the Borrower to purchase the ABCP at the MMMF’s amortized cost (the 
carrying value of the investment in the MMMF’s accounting records). A commentator notes 
that this was a necessary feature for any MMMFs to have incentives to participate. A 
purchase from the MMMF at amortized cost caused no detriment to remaining MMMF 
shareholders and, therefore, did not create further incentives for MMMF shareholders to 
redeem shares and place further liquidity pressure on the MMMFs (FR OIG 2010). MMMFs 
determined the amortized cost, and Borrowers certified to the purchase of the pledged ABCP 
at amortized cost as a condition of program participation. 
Credit Ratings 
Given that the AMLF loans were nonrecourse to the Borrowers, the credit ratings for eligible 
collateral were set high, and the FRBB daily reviewed the credit ratings of collateral for 
impairment.11 Even so, on April 22, 2009, the criteria for eligible collateral were tightened to 
require that AMLF-eligible ABCP be rated no lower than A-1/P-1/F1 (by any rating agency) 
at the time it was pledged. Additionally, paper that was rated A-1/P-1/F1 but was on 
“negative watch” for downgrade by any major NRSRO was excluded12 (FR OIG 2010).  
Redemption Threshold 
On June 25, 2009, a second program modification was adopted, a redemption threshold that 
required that MMMFs seeking to sell ABCP pursuant to the facility had to have experienced 
recent material outflows (AMLF FAQs). The redemption threshold is discussed in detail 
below. 
 
11 FR OIG 2010. Some limited impairment did occur. As of May 27, 2009, the Fed reported $1 billion in AMLF 
collateral was rated A-1/P-1/F1 but on watch for downgrade, and less than $500 million was rated below A-
1/P-1/F1, due to deterioration that occurred after it was pledged (FR Bd Gov June 2009). 
12 The initial standard would have permitted a lower rating as long as two NRSROs had rated it at the A-1/P-
1/F1 level. Paper with this rating that was on a “negative watch” for downgrade would also have qualified.  
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Eligible MMMFs 
As originally enacted, the AMLF was open to any fund that qualified as an MMMF under 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 2a-7,13 issued pursuant to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (Rule 2a-7). Although one of the stated purposes of the program was 
to “help restore liquidity to the ABCP markets and thereby to help money funds meet 
demands for redemption,” at first a selling MMMF did not have to meet any specific standard 
or provide proof that it had suffered significant or unusual redemption requests (AMLF 
FAQs). This is largely explained by the Fed’s Inspector General in a 2010 report by reference 
to the emergency that they faced and time constraints. The focus was on addressing the runs 
on MMMFs and unlocking the ABCP market:  
“Operationally, the AMLF’s original policies and procedures were established quickly 
to address the financial crisis in the ABCP market that led to MMMF redemptions. . . . 
Based on the severe market stress conditions that existed at the time and the pressure 
of investor redemption demands on the MMMFs, the AMLF terms did not specifically 
require that the ABCP be purchased solely from MMMFs experiencing material 
‘redemption pressure’” (FR OIG 2010).    
It should also be noted that the AMLF was the first facility put in place by the Fed following 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and the first in which the Fed sought to address distress among 
entities that it did not regularly deal with and a specific market. 
As stated above, AMLF-eligible collateral had to be purchased from an eligible MMMF after 
September 19, 2008.  
Redemption Threshold Defined 
After the initial aggressive utilization of the facility had subsided, the FRBB’s review revealed 
that some funds utilizing the facility might not have experienced significant redemption 
requests. To refocus the program, on June 25, 2009, a redemption threshold was established.  
Under the new requirement, which was intended to ensure that the facility was utilized as a 
backstop to fund redemption requests, Borrowers could only pledge to the AMLF ABCP that 
was purchased from an MMMF that had experienced material outflows, which were defined 
as: 
● outflows of at least 5% of the MMMF’s net assets in a single day; or  
● outflows of at least 10% of the MMMF’s net assets within the prior five business 
days or less (FR PR June 25, 2009). 
 
Material outflows were calculated as “net redemptions”—“redemptions less shares sold and 
dividends reinvested . . . calculated based on changes in the end of day net asset levels viewed 
at the consolidated fund level” (AMLF FAQs). Fluctuations in individual share classes of a 
fund were not considered in determining whether the fund was eligible to pledge ABCP to 
the AMLF (AMLF FAQs).  
  
 
13 17 CFR 270.2a-7. Among other things, Rule 2a-7 sets out the limits of what MMMFs can invest in.  
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Figure 2: AMLF Redemption Criterion & Eligibility Period 
An MMMF begins with net assets of $100 million and experiences net redemptions as follows 
over the following nine business day period: 
DAY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Net Sales 




($ in millions) 
100 96 92 89 90 92 86 87 85 82 
_ _ 
     EP1 EP EP EP EP    
        EP2 EP EP EP EP 
           EP3 EP 
a EP = eligibility period. The fund would enter a five-day eligibility period on day five owing to 
the 10% net redemptions over the preceding three-day period (days two through four).  
b The fund would enter a new five-day eligibility period on day eight owing to the single-day 
redemptions exceeding 5% on the preceding day (day seven).  
c Finally, the fund enters a new five-day eligibility period on day 11 owing to the 10% net 
redemptions over the preceding four-day period (days 7-10). 
Source: Author constructed based on information from AMLF FAQs. 
Because the FRBB could not verify net asset redemption levels using publicly available 
information, an MMMF seeking to sell ABCP pursuant to the AMLF was required to secure 
from its transfer agent a Certification Letter certifying to changes in the fund’s share levels 
(as an approximation of end-of-day net asset levels), over the prior 10-day period. The 
MMMF would need to provide this letter to the Borrower, which would submit it to the FRBB 
with the Request for Advance. (See Figure 2 for an example of how the redemption threshold 
and eligibility period operated.) 
Eligibility Period 
Once an MMMF experienced the trigger level of material outflows, any eligible ABCP 
satisfying the applicable eligibility requirements purchased from the MMMF on the five 
business days following the trigger day could be pledged pursuant to the AMLF. The five-day 
eligibility period was intended to provide funds a way to manage the redemption event. They 
would be able to utilize the AMLF the next day if redemptions continued but did not quite 
reach the eligibility trigger levels. If redemptions subsided after a day or two, the MMMF 
could choose not to utilize the AMLF. Additionally, if the trigger level was again met at any 
time (even during the original five-day eligibility period), a new five-day period would begin.  
Once an eligibility period ended, the MMMF would be ineligible for the program until it again 
experienced an eligibility-triggering event.  
Administration by FRBB 
The FRBB administered the AMLF and was authorized to make loans to eligible Borrowers 
on behalf of the other Reserve banks. All AMLF loans were recorded as assets by the FRBB. 
For loans extended to Borrowers that settled to depository accounts in districts other than 
Boston, the funds were credited to the Borrower’s depository account by the appropriate 
Reserve Bank and settled between the Reserve Banks through the interdistrict settlement 
account.  
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The FRBB reported the weekly average and Wednesday amounts of AMLF credit outstanding 
on its H.4.1 weekly statistical release. Beginning on June 10, 2009, the Fed also included 
additional anonymous information on AMLF transactions in its monthly reports (Federal 
Reserve Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet). This information included 
the number of Borrowers, Borrower by type of institution, collateral by type and credit 
rating, and data on the concentration of borrowing. No public disclosure was made of the 
individual Borrowers participating in the program or the amount of loans made to such 
Borrowers until 2010, when the Fed was compelled to make such disclosure under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Borrower Administrative Issues 
Because some Borrowers would be regulated banks and bank holding companies, the 
question arose as to how the ABCP purchased with AMLF loans would impact such entities’ 
reporting and capital requirements. To facilitate AMLF operations, the Fed adopted 
temporary limited exceptions to (i) its leverage and risk-based capital rules, and (ii) its 
restrictions on affiliate transactions (FR OIG 2010). 
Because the Borrower would bear no credit or market risk in holding ABCP pursuant to the 
AMLF, the Borrower would not be assessed any regulatory capital charge with respect to 
such ABCP, and such ABCP would receive a 0% risk weight for risk-based capital purposes 
and would be excluded from average total consolidated assets for leverage purposes. Also, 
under the AMLF, Borrowers could purchase ABCP from affiliates, and so such transactions 
were exempted from the usual restrictions on affiliate transactions.  
Outcomes 
The first loans made pursuant to the AMLF occurred on September 22, 2008, and maximum 
outstanding loans peaked at $152.1 billion on October 1, 2008, which equaled 21% of then-
outstanding ABCP. Borrowings declined thereafter as the market stabilized and redemption 
pressures waned. As of December 17, 2008, the aggregate amount of outstanding advances 
under the AMLF was $27.4 billion. (See Figure 3.) 
  
240
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 2 Iss. 3
 
Figure 3: Loans Extended under the AMLF, September 2008-September 2009 
 
Note: Data are weekly averages, based on the Fed’s H.4.1 statistical release.    
Source: Duygan-Bump et al. 2012. 
There was a bounce of activity from April 24 to May 8, 2009, prior to the government’s 
pending release of its Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)14 (also known as the 
bank stress tests) results. There was the possibility that the tests might result in some ABCP 
issuers being downgraded, which would have reduced the credit rating of their ABCP and, 
thus, made such ABCP ineligible for AMLF funding (FR OIG 2010). When the Fed’s later 
review revealed usage by funds that had not likely experienced unusual redemption 
requests, it was prompted to adopt the redemption threshold as discussed above. 
Borrowers, Paper Purchased & MMMFs That Sold 
During the program’s tenure, AMLF Borrowers purchased ABCP from 105 MMMFs, or 42% 
of AMLF-eligible prime MMMFs. The ABCP purchased was issued by 90 out of 170 active 
ABCP issuers and 47 out of 71 unique ABCP sponsors. The average AMLF loan was $68 
million and had an average maturity of 47 days and a maximum of 168 days (Duygan-Bump 
et al. 2012). 
There were seven Borrowers under the AMLF when viewed on a consolidated group basis,15 
but borrowings were dominated by just two, State Street Corporation and JPMorgan Chase 
& Co., which borrowed total amounts of $89 billion and $111 billion, respectively, or an 
aggregate of 92% of the amounts lent pursuant to the program (Condon 2011). Other 
institutions participating in the AMLF included Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon), 
Citigroup, Bank of America, SunTrust Banks Inc., and Credit Suisse Group AG (AMLF Trans. 
Data). No institution that asked to borrow was rejected (Condon 2011). 
JPMorgan Chase and BNY Mellon used AMLF funds to purchase ABCP from funds run by their 
own money-management units as well as from other funds. JPMorgan Chase used $17.6 
 
14 See Ross 2016 for a detailed description of the SCAP. 
15 In some cases, more than one related entity of a holding company was the named Borrower. For example, 
JPMorgan Chase Bank and JPMorgan Chase Broker Dealer were both Borrowers (AMLF Trans. Data).  
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billion, or 16% of the total that it borrowed, for this purpose. In BNY Mellon’s case, it used 
$11.5 billion, or 89% of the $12.9 billion that it borrowed, to purchase ABCP from its 
proprietary funds (Condon 2011). 
A commentator emphasizes that the main borrowers under AMLF were bank holding 
companies, and this was crucial in the operations of this program, as the Fed was the sole 
regulator of them. This meant that the Fed did not have to coordinate with other bank 
regulators in allowing for regulatory forbearance and other operations. 
Vanguard Group Inc. and Legg Mason Inc. were the only money fund providers among the 
top 10 that did not utilize the AMLF. Not surprisingly, the Reserve Primary Fund was the 
fund that sold the most ABCP pursuant to the AMLF, selling a total of $19.4 billion while the 
fund was liquidating (Condon 2010).  
Wind-down and Expiration 
Because of improved market conditions for ABCP (and possibly also the existence of other 
Fed programs, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF),16 which also 
purchased AMLF-eligible ABCP), the last borrowing under the AMLF occurred on May 8, 
2009, and matured on August 3, 2009. All loans made under the facility were repaid in full, 
with interest totaling $543 million, in accordance with the terms of the facility. The AMLF 
was originally established with an expiration date of January 30, 2009; however, the Fed 
extended the program three times, and it finally expired on February 1, 2010.   
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The AMLF was established under the Federal Reserve’s emergency powers under 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
In establishing the AMLF, the Fed sought to provide liquidity to MMMFs through broker-
dealers and bank holding companies. Therefore, it relied on its authority under Section 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) (12 U.S. Code Section 343), which permitted the Board, in 
unusual and exigent circumstances, to authorize Reserve Banks to extend credit to 
individuals, partnerships, and corporations that were unable to obtain adequate credit 
accommodations. In making its determination to invoke Section 13(3), the Fed made note 
that the MMMF industry held $3.4 trillion in assets (October 1, 2008), including $285 billion 
of the $840 billion in outstanding ABCP, and cited the significant increase in redemption 
requests battering the funds at a time when strains in the financial markets made it difficult 
for them to sell assets:  
In ordinary circumstances, MMMFs would have been able to meet these redemption 
demands by selling assets. At the time of the establishment of the AMLF, however, 
many money markets were extremely illiquid, and the forced liquidation of assets by 
MMMFs was placing increasing stress on already strained financial markets. If they 
continued, such forced sales could depress the price of ABCP and other short-term 
debt instruments, resulting in further losses to MMMFs and even higher levels of 
redemptions and a weakening of investor confidence in MMMFs and the financial 
markets more generally (FR Sect 129 Report AMLF). 
 
16 See Wiggins 2017 for a description of the CPFF. 
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2. The AMLF was funded through loans from the Federal Reserve discount window.  
The Fed funded the AMLF with loans from its discount window, extending this lending 
beyond the entities that it traditionally lent to in that the indirect beneficiaries of the AMLF 
loans were ultimately understood to be the MMMFs (FR OIG 2010). No special funding 
authorization other than invoking Section 13(3) was needed. The Fed utilized its standard 
discount window lending documentation and processes for the AMLF and charged the 
discount window primary credit lending rate for AMLF loans. Also, as discussed below, 
funding through the discount window helped facilitate the quick implementation of the 
program. No other fees were charged for AMLF loans, and no haircut was applied to the ABCP 
pledged as collateral.  
3.  The Federal Reserve made loans to depository institutions, broker-dealers, BHCs, 
and foreign branches that purchased eligible ABCP from MMMFs rather than lend 
to the fund directly or purchase and hold the ABCP directly. 
Although the Fed had authority under Section 13(3) to lend directly to MMMFs, it did not 
lend to such entities, and so it did not have established operational relationships with the 
funds that were to benefit from the AMLF. Additionally, as discussed on page 5 and in 
footnote 8, fund limitations may have made the funds reluctant or unable to borrow directly 
from the Fed. Also, the Fed was not authorized to purchase ABCP directly from the funds.  
To facilitate quick implementation of the program, the Fed relied on institutions with which 
it had existing relationships (depository institutions, bank holding companies, and broker-
dealers) to act as intermediaries and be the actual Borrowers under the program. It loaned 
funds to these institutions from its discount window, and they in turn purchased eligible 
ABCP from eligible MMMFs. The fact that the loans were made at the primary credit lending 
rate and that the loan maturity matched that of the ABCP reinforced the role of the 
Borrowers as pass-throughs. As long as the ABCP matured and was paid in full, the 
borrowers effectively earned the spread between the high rate on the ABCP and the primary 
credit rate.  
4. The Federal Reserve funded the loans from the discount window and relied on 
existing processes and known entities to quickly implement the AMLF.  
In designing the AMLF, the Fed was faced with providing a remedy quickly for fear that 
continued stress would jeopardize the ABCP market and MMMF industry, and possibly the 
broader economy. To achieve this goal in limited time, the Fed utilized depository 
institutions as intermediaries, its existing discount window processes and documentation, 
and the Reserve system interbank payment system for the basic infrastructure of the 
program. Most potential Borrowers would likely already have had in place the required 
discount window accounts and agreements that would enable them to request advances 
under the AMLF. If a potential Borrower did not, the Fed further simplified access by 
permitting such an entity to utilize a depository institution that already had such agreements 
as a correspondent; executing the discount window agreements was not even necessary. 
Also, potential Borrowers that were primary dealers participating in the PDCF could rely on 
that documentation for AMLF borrowing. These decisions enabled the AMLF to become 
operational in just a weekend.  
As a counterpoint, after announcing the AMLF, the Fed implemented the CPFF, which sought 
to unlock the still-illiquid commercial paper market. For the CPFF, the Fed did establish a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) to facilitate the purchase and custody of the CP and ABCP 
purchased, which were purchased from a wide variety of issuers rather than from a closed 
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class of regulated MMMFs. Further, the CPFF took much longer to structure than the 
weekend that transpired between the announcement of the AMLF and its first loans and 
would grow to be much larger than the AMLF.  
5. US subsidiaries of foreign entities were permitted to borrow under the AMLF. 
In seeking to encourage wide access and participation, the Fed permitted US subsidiaries of 
foreign banks that were depository institutions, bank holding companies, or broker-dealers 
to borrow under the AMLF. Such entities were required to submit slightly different 
application documents than those required of US entities, but it appears that this was a 
condition of discount window lending and not unique to AMLF participation. Only Credit 
Suisse Group AG participated in the AMLF, and the participation was small—just $240 
million, or 0.1% of the total.  
A commentator emphasizes that the main borrowers under AMLF were bank holding 
companies, and this was crucial in the operations of this program, as the Fed was the sole 
regulator of them. This meant that the Fed did not have to coordinate with other bank 
regulators in allowing for regulatory forbearance and other operations. 
6. Loans under the AMLF were nonrecourse to the Borrower and mirrored the 
purchase price and maturity of the ABCP that was pledged as collateral.  
The Fed sought to make the AMLF attractive to potential Borrowers so that they would 
participate, yet it was required to ensure that its loans were properly secured.17 Loans made 
under the AMLF were fully collateralized, but not over-collateralized. They were 
nonrecourse to the Borrower if all the requirements in the AMLF Agreement were adhered 
to; the nonrecourse protection would be forfeited if the agreement was breached (FR 
website). In the event of a default of the Borrower, the Fed would look to the collateral, the 
assets underlying the ABCP, and any financial support provided by the issuer of the ABCP. 
Unlike under many Fed liquidity programs implemented to fight the crisis, no haircut was 
applied to the ABCP purchased, and thus the amount of the loan, as well as its term, matched 
the purchase price and the term of the ABCP securing it. 
The term of an AMLF loan matched the maturity of the ABCP collateral that was purchased 
with, and secured, the loan. Allowable terms varied from overnight to 270 days. For 
Borrowers that were banks and bank holding companies, no advance under the AMLF could 
extend beyond 120 days. For Borrowers that were not banks, terms could extend up to 270 
days. Prepayment of the AMLF loans was not permitted, in whole or in part, except in the 
event of bankruptcy or receivership of the Borrower.   
7. Only certain high-quality ABCP could be pledged as collateral under the AMLF. 
To make the AMLF attractive to potential Borrowers, the credit risk associated with the ABCP 
was borne by the Fed, which could seize the collateral only in the event of default. The Fed 
did not vet the underlying issuers of the ABCP that it received as collateral for AMLF loans. 
To minimize the risk that it undertook, the Fed limited the ABCP that could be pledged as 
collateral under the AMLF to high-quality ABCP, i.e., that which was:   
 
17 See FRA Section 13(3), 12 U.S. Code Section 343. 
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● rated A-1/P-1/F1 by at least two Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs). If rated by only one NRSRO, the ABCP must have been 
rated within that NRSRO’s top rating category. 
On April 22, 2009, the criteria for eligible collateral were tightened to require that AMLF-
eligible ABCP be:  
● rated no lower than A-1/P-1/F1 at the time it was pledged. Additionally, paper 
that was rated A-1/P-1/F1 but was on “negative watch” for downgrade by any 
major NRSRO was excluded.  
In implementing a new program, it might be reasonable to consider this heightened 
standard. It would also be prudent to consider what impact this higher standard might have 
on the quantity of potential eligible collateral.  
8.   The amount of ABCP that any one Borrower could purchase was not limited.  
Unlike some other Fed programs adopted during the crisis, the AMLF was announced 
without a stated total amount.18 This may have been an indication of the Fed’s commitment 
to do what was needed to avoid another crash of the ABCP market like the one that occurred 
during the previous summer and to shore up the MMMFs, the collapse of which would have 
further negative consequences on investors’ confidence. Just announcing the program as 
open-ended might have had an added benefit in that it avoided debate as to whether the 
amount was sufficient.  
Additionally, at no time was the amount of loans that one Borrower could request under the 
AMLF limited. Ultimately, there were seven Borrowers (on a consolidated basis) under the 
AMLF, but borrowings were dominated by just two, State Street Corp. ($89 billion) and 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. ($111 billion), which borrowed 92% of the amount lent pursuant to 
the program.  
9.   The amount of ABCP that could be purchased from any one MMMF was not limited.  
As a program designed to stabilize the runs experienced by some MMMFs and to prevent 
another fund from “breaking the buck,” the AMLF did not include limits on the amount of 
ABCP that an MMMF could sell to a Borrower. To do so might have hindered its impact as a 
backstop since the sufficiency of such a limit could always be questioned. Nor could the Fed 
be expected to anticipate the amount of ABCP that any one fund might need to sell to meet 
the unprecedented redemption requests that were occurring. For example, the Reserve 
Primary Fund sold the most ABCP of any fund pursuant to the AMLF, $19.4 billion, and still 
ultimately it had to close. 
10. The AMLF was intended for MMMFs that experienced heightened redemption 
requests.  
Although the AMLF was designed to stabilize the redemption runs experienced by some 
MMMFs, the program did not originally require representations or proof that the fund had, 
indeed, experienced such redemptions. A review by the Fed after an early 2009 spurt of 
 
18 One measure of the program’s potential magnitude is that on September 17, 2008, two days before the 
program was announced, there was $765.5 billion in ABCP outstanding. If one assumes that MMMFs held 34% 
of this amount (the percentage of ABCP the MMMFs held at the end of year 2007), the total would be $260 
billion (FR OIG 2010). 
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borrowing, when redemptions had returned to normal, revealed that some funds might be 
using the program for other than its intended purposes (FR OIG 2010). To fine-tune the 
program and restrict future funding to those MMMFs that were in fact facing unusual 
redemptions, on June 25, 2009, the Fed added a requirement that eligible ABCP pledged as 
collateral had to be purchased from an MMMF that had experienced massive outflows (5% of 
net assets in one day or 10% of net assets in five days or less) within the five-day period 
prior to the purchase. By (i) including a specific definition and a clear calculation method and 
(ii) requiring a certificate from the fund’s Transfer Agent to support its claim of massive 
outflows, the Fed created a clear and objective process for determining when the redemption 
threshold was met that fostered the AMLF’s goals. After the change, the AMLF was unused. 
In creating a new program like the AMLF, one might consider including a similar redemption 
threshold and standard from the start.  
11. The AMLF provided MMMFs a period in which to consider whether to sell ABCP to 
address redemptions. 
As originally implemented, an MMMF could decide to sell ABCP pursuant to the AMLF a few 
days or weeks after it (presumably) experienced high redemption requests, making it 
somewhat questionable how closely the sale of the ABCP was tied to funding the 
redemptions. With the adoption of the redemption threshold, funds were compelled to make 
the decision to utilize the program within five days after the event triggering eligibility. In 
this way, the program retained some flexibility—funds could wait a few days to see if 
redemptions naturally declined—while also more closely aligning its usage with the 
heightened redemptions to which it was intended to respond.  
12. The Fed exercised regulatory forbearance in exempting participating banks and 
bank holding companies from relevant capital standards and restrictions on 
affiliate transactions. 
Because some Borrowers would be regulated banks and bank holding companies, the 
question arose as to how the ABCP purchased with AMLF loans would impact such entities’ 
reporting and capital requirements. To facilitate AMLF operations, the Fed adopted 
temporary limited exceptions to (i) its leverage and risk-based capital rules, and (ii) its 
restrictions on affiliate transactions. These exemptions were put in place the same day the 
AMLF was launched (FR OIG 2010).  
A commentator emphasizes that the main borrowers under AMLF were bank holding 
companies, and this was crucial in the operations of this program, as the Fed was the sole 
regulator of them. This meant that the Fed did not have to coordinate with other bank 
regulators in allowing for regulatory forbearance and other operations. 
Because the Borrower would bear no credit or market risk in holding ABCP pursuant to the 
AMLF, the Borrower would not be assessed any regulatory capital charge with respect to 
such ABCP, and such ABCP would receive a 0% risk weight for risk-based capital purposes 
and would be excluded from average total consolidated assets for leverage purposes. Also, 
under the AMLF, Borrowers could purchase ABCP from affiliates, and so such transactions 
were exempted from the usual restrictions on affiliate transactions under Section 23A of the 
FRA. 
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III. Evaluation 
The AMLF has generally been viewed as a factor in helping to stabilize the MMMFs as they 
coped with redemption requests and with providing liquidity to the ABCP market, although 
there have been some criticisms.  
A study by a group from the Fed and FRBB has commented favorably on the facility. Using 
detailed data, Duygan-Bump et al. (2012) concluded that the AMLF helped stabilize asset 
outflows from money market funds, with greater reductions in outflows occurring at funds 
that held more eligible collateral. The study shows that yields on eligible ABCP decreased 
significantly relative to yields on comparable but ineligible paper. The authors, however, also 
conclude that the lack of haircuts on collateral securing the AMLF loans created an incentive 
for MMMFs to use their riskiest eligible ABCP for the facility. 
Once individualized data regarding the AMLF was released in 2010, the program was 
criticized for not utilizing a bidding process to determine Borrowers, some of whom earned 
significant amounts from their AMLF borrowings. For example, State Street reported earning 
$75.6 million on the $89 billion of ABCP that it purchased pursuant to the program. JPMorgan 
also earned an estimated $93 million with respect to the $111 billion in ABCP that it 
purchased, some of it from its own funds. Controversy centered on these amounts being 
earned from acting purely as a pass-through while the Fed bore all the risk of the investments 
(Condon 2011). 
Commenting on such arguments in 2011, William Nelson, a Fed official, said that urgency 
was a factor and that at the time, the Fed was responding to a “national emergency.” “Had we 
implemented the program with less-attractive terms, we would have risked falling short in 
our effort to stop the run on money-market mutual funds and seeing a far worse financial 
crisis” (Condon 2011). 
Also in 2011, Brian Reid, Chief Economist of the Investment Company Institute, a trade group 
for MMMFs, favorably reviewed the program, saying that “[the] AMLF was critical in 
restoring liquidity and confidence to the commercial-paper market. . . Money-market funds 
turned from net sellers of commercial paper into net buyers after the Fed launched the 
program” (Condon 2011). 
It must also be noted, however, that several factors make it difficult to isolate any specific 
impact that the AMLF had on reviving the CP markets. During the crisis, many fund sponsors 
provided significant assistance to their funds, taking advantage of separate 23A exemptions. 
Some of these may have “broken the buck” without such aid (Brady, Anadu, and Cooper 
2012). Also, the Temporary Guarantee, CPFF, and the Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF),19 all programs that were directed at providing liquidity to and stabilizing 
the MMMFs and CP market, were coexistent with the AMLF, which experienced its greatest 
usage near its inception. 
 
19 The MMIFF was a companion Section13 (3) program designed to also provide liquidity to the MMMFs. Under 
the MMIFF, the Fed would provide loans to a series of SPVs established by the private sector, which would in 
turn use these funds, along with funds from the issuance of ABCP, to purchase eligible money market 
instruments (certificates of deposit, bank notes, and commercial paper) from eligible money market investors, 
including MMMFs. Although no loans were issued under the MMIFF, it cannot conclusively be said that its 
availability did not have an impact on the market. (See Wiggins MMIFF Intervention when complete.). 
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Significantly, the CPFF, which would grow to be one of the Fed’s largest crisis-fighting 
programs, made its first purchases on October 27, 2008; at the time, utilization of the AMLF 
was decreasing after an initial spurt of usage. By the end of the year, the total value of 
commercial paper purchased under the CPFF equaled $335 billion, out of which one-third 
was ABCP ($110 billion) (Wiggins 2017). Aside from one small stint of activity during spring 
2009, the AMLF remained generally unused as the ABCP that it financed matured. 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
AMLF: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, Updated February 5, 2010 – Federal 
Reserve Discount Window webpage providing details regarding the rules and requirements of 




AMLF: Program Terms and Conditions: Updated February 5, 2010 – Federal Reserve Discount 





ABCP MMMF Liquidity Facility Request Form – Form required to be submitted by the 
Borrower identifying specific details regarding (i) the collateral to be purchased, (ii) the 
MMMFs that it was being purchased from, and (iii) after June 26, 2009, share confirmation 
information from the MMMF’s transfer agent to satisfy the redemption threshold. 20 
AMLF Advance Request Form – Form submitted by the Borrower to request an advance under 
the AMLF, specifying information regarding the Borrower, the ABCP, and the MMMF. 21 
 
20 Document is referred to in the research but not yet located. 
21 Document is referred to in the research but not yet located. 
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AMLF Form of Letter Agreement – As of June 29, 2009, this form of letter agreement, which 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/mmmfloa.pdf.  
 
Appendix 3—Application Package for US Borrowers.  Application materials for US borrowers 
to participate in the program. 
Appendix 4—Application Package for Branches or Agencies of Non-US Borrowers – 
Documents that need to be completed by a non-US borrower to participate in the program. 
Similar to the documents required by US borrowers. 
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documents to be adhered to and executed by issuers seeking to qualify to access the discount 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Required%20Agreements.p
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Operating Circular No. 10: Lending – Federal Reserve circular providing substantive terms and 
instructions on how an entity may obtain advances from, incur obligations to, or pledge 




Transfer Agent Certification – Form completed by an MMMF’s transfer agent to verify 
compliance with the redemption threshold; submitted with the AMLF Advance Request Form.22  
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
Minutes of September 19, 2008 – FOMC Minutes adopting and authorizing the AMLF and 
related rule changes. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_Discount_Window_200
8_07_13.pdf. 
SEC Rule 2a-7 (17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7) – SEC rule governing MMMFs. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CFR-2017-title17-vol4-
sec270-2a-7.pdf. 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC §343) – Section of the Federal Reserve act 




22 Document is referred to in the research but not yet located. 
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Section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC §347(b) (a)) – Section of the Federal Reserve 




Federal Reserve Board announces the adoption of two final rules providing temporary 
limited exceptions from (i) the Board’s leverage and risk-based capital rules for bank holding 
companies and state member banks and (ii) sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve 
Act, which establish certain restrictions on and requirements for transactions between a 
bank and its affiliates, in order to facilitate lending under the AMLF (01/30/2009). Press 






Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the AMLF (09/19/2008).  Press release 





Federal Reserve Board announces the extension, through October 30, 2009, of five liquidity 






Federal Reserve Board announces extensions of, and modifications to, several of its liquidity 
programs, including the AMLF, to February 1, 2010, and implements a redemption threshold 






Federal Reserve Board extends the AMLF through April 30, 2009 (12/02/2008). Press 





Federal Reserve Board releases a statement from its January 26-27 FOMC meeting 
confirming the upcoming expiration of several liquidity facilities, including the AMLF, in light 
of improved economic conditions (01/27/2010). Press release announcing the expiration of 
Federal Reserve liquidity programs. 
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Fed Made State Street Profitable as Money-Fund Middleman in ’08 (www.bloomberg.com, 
08/23/2011) – Article discussing the usage of the AMLF focusing on the Borrowers.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bloomberg%20page%202
%20PDF.pdf. 
Reserve Primary Tops Users of Fed Aid to Money Funds (www.bloomberg.com, 
12/01/2010) – Article discussing the usage of the AMLF focusing on MMMFs.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bloomberg%20PDF.pdf. 
Rushing to Save Money-Market Funds (www.money/cnn.com, 09/19/2008) – Article 
discussing the Treasury Department’s guarantee and the two Federal reserve programs aimed 
at stabilizing MMMFs.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CNN.pdf.  
Key Academic Papers 
Federal Reserve Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities (Wiggins and 
Metrick 2016) – Case study examining the programs adopted by the Federal Reserve during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis to address the disrupted commercial paper market. 
https://som.yale.edu/case/2015/the-federal-reserve-s-financial-crisis-response-d-
commercial-paper-market-facilities.  
Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 (Fleming 2012) 




How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (Duygan-





AMLF Transaction Data – Data files regarding loans made pursuant to the AMLF are available 
at the Federal Reserve website at ⎯ 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/amlf.xls. 
Domestic Open Market Operations During 2008 (01/2009) – A report prepared for the FR 
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Domestic Open Market Operations During 2009 (01/2010) – A report prepared for the FR 
FOMC by the Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs, including the 
AMLF. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_09.pdf. 
Domestic Open Market Operations During 2010 (03/2011) – A report prepared for the FR 
FOMC by the Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs, including the 
AMLF. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_10.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Financial Statements – Financial Statements as of and for the 
Years Ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, and Independent Auditors' Report; includes 
information regarding the AMLF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BSTBostonfinstmt2009.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Board 95th Annual Report, 2008 – Compilation of policy actions taken by the 
FR Board, minutes of the FOMC meetings, and litigation occurring in 2008, which includes 
mentions of the AMLF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_%2095th%20Annual%
20Report,%202008.pdf.  
Federal Reserve Board Monthly Reports on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance 
Sheet – Report of the FR Board prepared from June 2009 to August 2012 as part of its efforts 
to enhance transparency in connection with its lending and financial stability programs. After 
August 2012, similar information was published in the “Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve 





OIG Report (11/2010) – Report prepared by the Fed Office of Inspector General that discusses 
the function and status of the various Fed lending programs, including the AMLF, and which 
identifies the risks in each facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Rep
ort_final-11-23-10_web.pdf.  
Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the EESA (11/03/2008) – Fed report specifically 
addressing the AMLF. Report is updated by the later, general, Section 129 reports. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/129amlf.pdf.  
Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the EESA (12/29/2008) – Fed report updating 






Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the EESA (02/25/2009) – Fed report updating 
the status of outstanding lending facilities authorized under FRA §13(3).  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/129periodicupdate0225200
9.pdf.    
Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the EESA (06/26/2009) – Fed report updating 
the status of outstanding lending facilities authorized under FRA §13(3).  
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Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the EESA (08/25/2009) – Fed report updating 
the status of outstanding lending facilities authorized under FRA §13(3).  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/129periodicupdate0825200
9.pdf. 
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